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Caldwell: Contribution--Where
Joint QUARTERLY
Principal Pays Tort Judgement Again
WEST VIRGINIAOne
LAW
ferring this priority unconstitutional as impairing contractual

obligations.'
There is an increasing sentiment against this
preference because of its obvious unfairness!'
-KNGsLEY

R. SMITH.

CONTRIBUTION WHERE ONE JOINT PRINCIPAL PAYS TORT
JUDGMENT AGAINST AGENT. - A tract of land was owned jointly

by A and B, as executors and trustees of the estate of X, by C,
and by D. An agent, Drebert, had charge of the land for all the
owners when a tenant, Massey, was killed by electrically charged
wire. In an early action a judgment was recovered by the personal
representative of the deceased against A and B, as executors and
trustees. This was reversed,1 as a trust estate is not liable for the
torts of the trustees who are free from the control of the beneficiaries. Thereafter, another suit was instituted against A and B.
and the agent, Drebert. A and B being dismissed from this
suit upon a plea in abatement for defective service of process,
judgment was taken against Drebert, which with costs was paid
by A and B, as executors and trustees.
In the principal case
A and B and C sued the administrator of D, since deceased, for
contribution. Held: Rulings of the trial court that contribution
between joint tort-feasors is not permitted and that the payment
was voluntarily made were error. Payne v. Charleston National
Bank!
At common law there was no contribution between joint tortfeasors,' and because of the unjust effect of the application of the
rule in certain cases exceptions have developed,' and the test most
I Harris v. Walker, 199 Ala. 51, 74 So. 40 (1917) (right of depositors of
an insolvent bank held to have arisen out of a contract with the bank as
controlled by a constitutional guaranty then in force. This was held an
"obligation of a contract" which could not be impaired by either the constitution or a statute); Atchafalaya R. & Banking Co. v. Bean, 3 Rob. 414
(La. 1843) (legislature cannot constitutionally change relative rank of creditors inter se by an act subsequent to the creation of the debt.
"See the comment on Central Trust Co. v. Bank of Mullens, 107 W. Va.
679, 150 S. E. 221 (1929) in (1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 278.
' Massey v. Payne, 109 W. Va. 529, 155 S. E. 658 (1930).
2Payne v. Massey, 164 S. E. 252 (W. Va., 1932).
3Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. 186, 101 Eng. Reprint 1337 (1799);
TsiRoCKMORTON'S CooLEY oN TORTs (Student ed., 1930) § 81.
'Where the party was only technically liable, Chicago Rys. v. R. F. Conway Co., 219 Il. App. 220 (1920); where the ground of liability is negligence in carrying on a lAwful business, Harriban v. City of Des Moines, 198
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often applied seems to be whether the parties must be presumed
to have known that they were committing an illegal or wrongful
act.5
Some states now allow contribution between joint tort-feasors
by statute.' The West Virginia statute, first adopted in 1872 and
since subjected only to slight modifications in wording by amendments, permits contribution only where there has been a joint
judgment rendered against the tort-feasor4. The principal case,
then, was not governed by the statute.
In West Virginia the question has usually arisen where two
or more tort-feasors have asked to be dismissed from an action because they are in law severally liable.' The unusual situation in
the principal case, however, is probably without parallel in the
reports. The cases most nearly in point0 may be distinguished
because the judgment in the principal case was against the agent.
The judgment below declared that the agent, "was guilty of
misfeasance in his duty to said decedent."
This fact, that the
agent's liability in relation to the principals was never fixed, and
the further fact that the trust estate of X was exonerated from
all liability (yet A and B paid their part of the judgment against
the agent out of the trust estate), supports the argument that the
payment was voluntarily made. The courts and text writers speak
Ia. 549, 194 N. W. 988 (1925); where the tort does not involve moral turitude, it is the same as the right in a contract, Ellis v. Chicago & N. W. R.rI
167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. 1048 (1918) ; where the tort was that of a servant
or agent, Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co., 66 Pa. 218 (1870); and where the
act was not inalum in se, Hutcherson v. Slate, 105 W. Va. 184, 192 S. E. 444
(1929); Buskirk v. Sanders, 70 W. Va. 863, 73 S. E. 937 (1912).
"I COOLEY ON TORTS (3rd ed., 1906) 258.

'Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 484a; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie 1930) §
618; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) § 5779; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 4223;
and W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 7, § 13.
SOhio Valley Bank v. Greenbaum Sons & Trust Co., 11 Fed. (2d) 91 (C.
C: A. 4th, 1926).
8Martin v. Appalachian Power Co., 109 W. Va. 129, 153 S. E. 245 (1930);
Massey v. Payne, supra n. 1; Starcher v. Penn Oil Co., 81 W. Va. 587, 95
S. E. 28 (1918); Blevins v. Bailey, 102 W. Va. 415, 135 S. E..395 (1926);
Pence v. Bryant, 73 W. Va. 126, 80 S. E. 923 (1912); and Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639, 28 S. E. 744 (1897).
9Where the tortfeasors were two counties both liable for the maintenance
of a bridge and a judgment was rendered against one, Armstrong Co. v.
Clarion Co., supra n. 2; where the negligence was the constructing of a
party wall and a judgment was entered against both tortfeasors, Ankey v.
Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N. W. 320 (1887); and where the agent of two
principals injured a third person with an automobile and the judgment was
against both principals, Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 At]. 815 (1918).
10Cooley on Torts (4th ed., 1931) 297, § 89; Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St.
203 (1853); Price v. Ryan & Dickinson, 255 N. Y. 16, 173 N, B, 107
(1930).
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of compelling to pay,"0 which is based on a money judgment
against one or all the tort-feasors. In Kentucky' the court has
said, "There must have been a satisfaction of the judgment before the suit can be entertained, as the right to contribution rests
on an implied contract and is enforced accordingly."
As an agent is liable for -his torts, independently of his principal, and as an agent can be sued jointly with the principal when
it is shown that both were at fault,' and since only the agent may
be liable in a given case, the contention that the payment was
voluntarily made seems sufficient to defeat the right to contribution.
-CHARESS W. CALDWELL.

CouRTs -

EQUITABLE

ENFORCEMENT

OF FOREIGN

ALImONY

DECREE. - Complainant had been granted a divorce and alimony
in a Florida Court, which retained jurisdiction. She went into
equity in Georgia and obtained a writ of ne exeat, a decree for
accrued alimony and counsel fees, and an injunction to prevent
defendant from removing any of his property from the county.
The court declared in general terms that the foreign decree must
be given full faith and credit in Georgia. Roberts v. Roberts.'
Courts have allowed as a matter of course the bringing of
a suit on a foreign decree for accrued alimony.' Future alimony
is not the basis for such a decree unless it be shown that the
original decree is not subject to modification by the foreign
court.0 A contrary result was reached in a recent California ease
where future installments of alimony were covered by the decree
though the foreign court retained jurisdiction, it being stipulated
that in case of modification the California decree should operate
subject thereto." These foreign decrees, whether sued upon in
law or equity, are entitled to full faith and credit under the Federal Constitution.' Though equity may grant relief on a decree
"Consolidated Coach Co. v. Wright, 231 -Ky. 713, 22 S. W. (2d) 108

(1929).

"Lee v. Standard Oil Co., 105 W. Va. 579, 44 S. E. 292 (1828).
1163 S. E. 735 (Ga. 1932).
1 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 682 (1909); Barber v. Barber, 21
How. 582, 16 L. ed. 226 (1858).
' Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183, 21 S. Ct. 555 (1900).
'Cummings v. Cummings, 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 Pac. 245 (1929).
5$istare v, $istare, supra n. 2,
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